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INTRODUCTION
"A beginning is the time for taking the most delicate care that the balances are
correct."' Society is now at the beginning of an information age unlike anything it has yet
experienced. Digitization and the expansion of computer networks allow us new
capabilities which can create great benefits, but maximization is only possible through
rules which embrace the future with vision and foresight.
The new technology is significant in that it creates an opportunity for people to have
access to information previously unavailable. As Ethan Katsh puts it:
Communication in writing and print, indeed communication via any form other
than the spoken word, is an attempt to overcome barriers caused by the spatial
separation of two or more individuals. At the heart of the new media are
capabilities for working with space in novel ways and for overcoming
constraints that are assumed to be fixed, but, in reality, are only constraints
imposed by limitations of print and writing.2
Though the possibilities are vast and raise a host of legal issues,, this Comment looks
only at one possibility and its conflict with one area of law in order to illustrate the nature
of the conflict ahead and why lawmakers will need to be creative and not slavish
followers of the old ways. To this end, this Comment describes the fatal effect of
imposing current copyright law on digital systems and the signal this sends to those who
would attempt to reconcile the digital library with the Copyright Act of 1976.
Additionally, this Comment disciisses the international implications created by a network
of intellectual property treaties and suggests means by which the goals of copyright can
be harmonized with the digital library and the technology it represents. Such descriptions
and suggestions are especially relevant in light of certain recommendations being
considered by lawmakers who fail to account properly for the fundamental paradigmatic
shift in the nature of communications engendered by electronically networked digital
communication systems.
The lawmakers are also making recommendations which unfairly favor the rights of the
copyright owner and do not give enough consideration to the goal of widespread
dissemination of information and ideas. Part I of this Comment describes the form and
function of a digital library. Part II describes copyright law in its current form. Part III
describes recommended modifications to copyright law designed to cope with problems
created by the new media. Part IV describes some of the international implications of the
current struggle to adapt laws to the new situation. Part V analyzes the likely
effectiveness of old copyright law and the proposed modifications in dealing with the
1. FRANK HERBERT, DuNE 3 (1964).
2. M. Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World. Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REv. 403, 413
(1993).
3. Issues about how the new media and the law interact include, but certainly are not limited to, such things as how
law itself is defined by the medium in which it is conveyed. Laws of an oral culture are different from those ofa culture
dominated by print, which in turn are arguably different from those cultures which will be dominated by digital media.
Privacy interests and the First Amendment are implicated by questions of how we should control the distribution of
personal information such as purchasing habits and mailing addresses which are bought and sold by corporations. It is
unclear what sort of liability the multitudes of individual publishers, authors, and readers who create and use home pages,
newsgroups, and the rest of cyberspace will incur. See M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRoNIC MEDIA AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 10-16 (1989).
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digital media. Finally, Part VI suggests some alternative "solutions" to the copyright
problem.
I. THE DIGITAL LIBRARY
Among the possibilities of the Internet,4 albeit not one of the most original, is the
creation of a digital library. Such a library could contain a collection of books,
documents, music, movies, games, or any other kind of information capable of being
digitized; that is, translated into a series of ones and zeroes.'
Creating a mundane sort of library is a simple use of digital technology which merely
entails electronically storing information currently available in traditional libraries.6 Due
to the ease with which its contents could be reproduced, one such library could serve
school children from Compton, California, to Brooklyn, New York, to Nairobi, Kenya.
With a little creativity, a digital library could supplant the traditional library,
distinguishing itself by such tools as hypertext7 and interactivity.' Using hypertext, for
example, news articles could be linked to reference documents explaining specific topics
within the article.9 This means that an article reporting about the conflict in Bosnia could
have a hypertext link to a document giving a brief history of Bosnia and Eastern Europe
which in turn contains links to documents that provide even more detailed information.
Furthermore, the article could have a link to a discussion group where interested readers
could share ideas about the article or the issue in general.
In his book, Literary Machines, Theodor Nelson lays out a comprehensive plan for a
library characterized by hypertext and interactivity."0 Nelson describes a digital library
4. The term "Intemee' also includes the term "information superhighway" though the latter term is quickly falling
out of favor among network users. It has been suggested that the metaphors by which we choose to describe emerging
technologies can stunt their growth. For example, thinking of radio technology in terms of a "wireless telegraph" blinded
early users to the possibilities of broadcasting. Similarly, thinking of the new digital technology in terms of a highway has
the effect of making our thoughts overly linear and too prone to missing possibilities which are not immediately obvious.
See generally Harmeet Sawhney, Information Superhighway: Metaphors asMidwhes, 18 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC'Y 291
(1996).
5. The ability to translate an image, text, sound, or film into ones and zeroes means that this information can be
communicated between computers at high speeds using comparatively little physical material. Such digitization tends to
blur the lines between originals and copies, displays and distributions, and even authors and their audiences. See Kenneth
D. Salmon & Michael J. Pierce, Copyright Law andthe Information Superhighway, 96 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 315, 315-16
(Mar. 9, 1995).
6. One such movement is taking place at Columbia University Law School which announced plans to develop a
digital law library containing material from deteriorating works and other public domain material. See William M.
Bulkeley, Libraries Shififrom Books to Computers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1993, at B6.
7. Hypertext is a means of linking electronic documents. If a document has a link to a particular subject, the subject
name is highlighted on the screen. This allows an interested reader to find out more about the highlighted topic by using
their mouse to click on the topic which cues the computer to call up the document or list of documents discussing the
subject.
8. A digital library featuring hypertext would be interactive at least in the sense that the reader would choose which
links to follow and which links to leave unread, meaning that to some extent each reader's sense of a given article would
differ depending on choices made by that reader. In other words, the reader interacts with the text. George P. Landow
asserted that an important quality of hypertext is that it "does not permit a tyrannical, univocal voice. Rather the voice
is always that distilled from the combined experience of the momentary focus, the lexia one presently reads, and the
continually forming narrative of one's reading path." GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT AND MULTIVOCALIY:
THE CONVERGENCE OF CONTE"PORARY CRrnCAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY (1992) (available at
http://www.stg.brown.edu/projetshypertext/landow/httmultvoc.htrnl).
9. See Jon Katz, Online or Not, Newspapers Suck 2.09 WIRED, Sept. 1994, at 50, 54.
10. Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Intellectual Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext
PublishingSystems, 6 HARV. J. L. &TECH. 237,239 n.9 (1993) (citing THEODORH. NELSON, LirERARY MACHINEs (5th
ed. 1983)).
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in which authors waive their typical copyrights" and pay a fee to put their works in the
library, which Nelson calls Xanadu.12 In exchange for their contributions, the authors
receive a percentage of the money paid for the use of their works. 3 Each user would pay
Xanadu based on the number of bytes of information they access.' 4 Users would have the
option of creating their own work, links to older works, or between multiple works."
Furthermore, users would have the option of creating their own works which have links
to older documents or perhaps creating a linked index to multiple documents which
arranges older documents in a novel and useful way. In this case, user/link-creators would
get paid according to the use of their work.', The original author would also receive a
percentage based on the link to that author's work.' 7
In addition to the benefits of wide dissemination of information and those that stem
from hypertext, there is an environmental benefit. An electronic library depends on
considerably less physical material for its existence than a physical library, thereby
conserving not only paper and other materials but also conserving land that the building
would occupy. These conservation effects would surely benefit the earth's environment.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law is a creation of the print era." Before the time of Gutenberg and his
printing press, there was no need for copyright laws because copying was prohibitively
difficult and, without a practical means of mass production, there was no economic
interest which might have encouraged legal protection. 9 Furthermore, literature was held
to be part of a common fund of knowledge.20
After .the introduction of the printing press in England in 1476, but before the
enactment of the Statute of Anne2' (the first "modem" Anglo-Saxon copyright law) in
1709, licensing acts performed the function of copyright law. These licensing acts served
as a form of political censorship and trade regulation. It is notable that the monarchy used
a guild, a medieval economic institution as an instrument, to censor the heresy and
11. See supra part II for information about what rights are waived and about copyright law in general. For now, it
is sufficient to say that what Nelson describes is a system which uses licensing agreements rather than the default rules
of copyright law.
12. See Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 10, at 247.
13. Id. at 249.
14. Id. at 248-50.
15. Id. at 249-50.
16. Id. at 247-53.
17. Id.
18. KATSH, supra note 3, at 172.
19. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) ("Indeed it was the invention of a new
form of copying equipment--the printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.").
20. KATSH, supra note 3, at 172.
21. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 21 (Eng.).
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sedition made possible by the printing press.22 Thus, it is evident that governments
rapidly saw both the political and economic implications of an information revolution.'
After the Statute of Anne, copyright law became less a tool of the state and more a tool
of authors and publishers."' Such a development reflected both an increasing respect for
the rights of the authors as well as the growing economic opportunity of authors'
creations.?
The authority of Congress to pass copyright laws is grounded in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution which says, "The Congress shall have Power ... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '26
This constitutional clause has two primary aspects:
1) It indicates that the ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to promote the
progress of science and arts; in other words, to foster the growth and spread of learning
and culture. 2) In order to achieve this purpose, authors are to be given exclusive rights
to exploit their writings, to encourage them to create and disseminate new works.27
The Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act") embodies current copyright law.28 It affords
protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device" 29 except
where such original works constitute an "idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery."3
There are three requirements for copyright protection: originality, creativity, and
fixation. The originality requirement mandates that the work be an independent creation,
meaning simply that it cannot have been copied.3" This standard is much less rigorous
than that of patent law which requires not only that there be an independent creation but
that it also be novel, not known or practiced previously.3 2 In theory, under copyright law,
if an independently created work happened to be an exact duplicate of a previously
existing work, the new work would not constitute an infringement.33
22. KATsH, supra note 3, at 173-74. The English monarchy chartered the Stationers' Company, a guild with an
exclusive monopoly on printing. Only a member of the guild had the right to make copies of a manuscript. Beholden as
it was to the monarchy, the creation of the Stationers' Company was an effective means of governmental surveillance of
the press. MARK ROSE, AurHoRs AND OwNER-THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 12 (1993). In fact, the preamble to the
Stationers' Company Charter explicitly states the royal purpose:
"[K]now ye that we, considering and manifestly perceiving that certain seditious and heretical books
rhymes and treatises are daily published and printed by divers scandalous malicious schismatical and
heretical persons, not only moving our subjects and leiges to sedition and disobedience against us, our
crown and dignity, but also to renew and move very great and detestable heresies against the faith and
sound catholic doctrine of Holy Mother Church, and wishing to provide a suitable remedy in this behalf."
Id. (citing A TRANSCRPr OFTH REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON: 1554-1640,1875-1894 xxviii
(Edward Arber ed., 1950)).
23. KATSH, supra note 3, at 173-74.
24. Id. at 174.
25. Id. at 174-75.
26. U.S. CONS. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Abe A. Goldman, The Concept of the Law of Cbpyright, in REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHTLAW 11, 12 (Lowell
H. Hattery & George P. Bush eds., 1964).
28. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
29. Id. § 102(a).
30.Id. § 102(b).
31. Id. § 102(a).
32.35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1994).
33. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 33 (2d ed. 1995).
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To satisfy the creativity requirement a work need only have a de minimis amount of
creativity.34 Courts have found sufficient originality in such banal creations as the label
on a box of cake which simply depicts pictures of cakes.35 Though the creativity standard
is very low, there are still limits on what will fulfill the requirement. For example,
originality was not found to exist in fragmentary words or phrases.1
6
Finally, the fixation requirement is similarly broad in that it allows for fixation even
in media not yet developed.
[l]t makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be-whether
it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic
indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic,
sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of
perception directly or by means of any machine or device.
3
A copyright grants the copyright owners a number of exclusive rights which are
modified by certain exceptions. A copyright holder has the exclusive rights of
reproducing the work, preparing derivative works, distributing copies, performing the
work publicly, and displaying the work publicly. 3
Because of the nonphysical nature of the electronic media that copyright law will
attempt to govern and the problems created thereby, it is important to note that, with the
possible exception of the right to prepare derivative works, the exclusive rights of § 106
as well as the requirment of tangible fixation all focus on the physical manifestation of
the work and not on the images and ideas which actually constitute the work. Copyright
law uses the physical manifestation of the work as a proxy for the work itself.39 This is
ironic and problematic since the value of most copyrighted works lies in the images and
ideas for which the physical manifestation is merely a vehicle. John Perry Barlow, co-
founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, aptly described the problem, saying:
"So far we have placed all of our intellectual [property] protection on the containers and
not on the contents. And one of the side effects of digital technology is that it makes
those containers irrelevant. Books, CDs, filmstrips-whatever-don't need to exist
anymore in order to get ideas out. So whereas we thought we have been in the wine
business, suddenly we realized all along we've been in the bottling business.""
This concentration on physical manifestation (or fixation on fixation) can lead to some
unfair results. For example, a compilation of minimal creativity would be protected so
long as it was in writing while a more creative and socially valuable work of authorship
such as an improvisation or unrecorded choreographic work would not be protected
unless it was recorded.4
34. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991) (stating that "even a slight amount will
suffice").
35. LEAFFER, supra note 33, at 42 (citing Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir. 1959)).
36. Id. (citing Aberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the phrase "most
personal sort of deodorant" is not copyrightable)).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 [hereinafter
HousE REPORTI.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
39. See generally John P. Barlow, The Economy ofide av, 2.3 WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 85-87.
40. Charles W. Beardsley, Uncorking Fine Wine: Copyright Laws, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, Aug. 1994, at 6
(quoting John P. Barlow).
41. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665.
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Several exceptions such as fair use,42 library archival copying,43 and the right to
publicly display a privately owned copy, limit the author's copyrights." These exceptions
tend to apply where the benefits of disseminating ideas outweigh any potential injury to
the creator's economic interests.45 For example, under the fair use doctrine, persons may
use a copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research as long as such a use is fair." In determining whether
a use is fair, § 107 of the Act requires consideration of a number of factors including: the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is commercial or not-for-
profit; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the
copyrighted work used; and the effect of the use upon the copyrighted work's potential
market or value.
47
Section 107's structure is illustrative of its intent. It first identifies methods of
dissemination which are socially desirable. It then weighs the needs of the socially
desirable activity against the economic harm imposed on the owner of the copyright. This
intent is in turn reflective of the constitutional mandate in Article 8 which employs an
economic incentive as an instrument to further the sciences and useful arts. 4
III. THE GREEN PAPER
There is little doubt that current copyright law, fairly read, would prohibit the creation
of a digital library wherein most of the world's knowledge could be accessible from any
house, school, library, place of work, or any other place capable of supporting a computer
terminal.
49
This prohibition is made clear by the Information Infrastructure Task Force ("Task
Force") in their July, 1994 paper commonly known as the Green Paper." The Task Force
was formed by President Clinton in February, 1993, "to articulate and implement the
Administration's vision for the National Information Infrastructure."'" The term National
Information Infrastructure ("NIl"), as the Task Force contemplates it, "is intended to
encompass the digital, interactive services now available, such as the Internet, as well as
those contemplated for the future."52 The reason for this evaluation by the Task Force is
a recognition that the advance of communications technology has had (and will continue
42. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c).
45. See, e.g., Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of1976, in THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976:
DEALING WrrHNEW REALTnEs 11, 23-24 (Alan Latman ed., 1976).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cf. 8.
49. Mary Brandt Jensen, Is the Library Without Walls on a Collision Course with the 1976 Copyright Act, 85 LAW
LIR. J. 619 (1993). With today's technology enabling wireless communication through devices such as cellular phones,
computer terminals can literally be placed anywhere.
50. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURETASK FORCE, U.S. DEP T OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1994) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER]. Mary Brandt Jensen also reaches this
conclusion. Jensen, supra note 49. Jensen concludes that a library without walls (a digital library) cannot be built without
copying the works into a machine-readable form. Id. at 641. The fair use, public performance, or public display exceptions
to the § 106 exclusive rights will almost never save such wholesale copying. Therefore, the works which would be placed
into this library without walls could only be placed there after tracking down the author and negotiating a compensation
scheme. Id. Jensen contends that under current copyright law this arrangement would be so impractical and burdensome
that it would delay, if not prevent, the creation of a true digital library. Id. at 642.
51. GREEN PAPERsupra note 50, at I.
52.1d. at 2 n.2.
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to have) an unprecedented effect on the creation, reproduction, and dissemination of
-copyrighted works. 3 The Task Force contends that such an unprecedented effect will in
turn generate both challenges and important opportunities for the copyright
marketplace. 4
In considering the copyright issues raised by new technology, the Task Force noted
that digitization and the computer networks present neither the first nor the last
challenge.5 They say, however, that the stakes are now considerably higher because any
two-dimensional work can readily be digitized. 6 This increases "the ease and speed with
which a work can be reproduced; the quality of the copies (both the first and the
hundredth 'generation'); the ability to manipulate and change the work; and the speed
with which copies ... can be 'delivered' to the public."57
In considering the raised stakes, the Task Force was mindful of Thomas Jefferson's
statement:
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and
institutions must go hand and hand with the progress of the human mind. As that
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths
discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy.5"
However, at the end of its analysis, Jefferson's words notwithstanding, the Task Force
concludes that although "[t]he coat is getting a little tight," '59 with "no more than minor
clarification and amendment, the Copyright Act... will provide the necessary protection
of rights-and limitations on those rights-to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts."6°
As one of the "minor" clarifications, the Task Force recommends that the works which
are to be transmitted through the NII be deemed "fixed" for purposes of § 102 of the Act.
This recommendation stems from the Task Force's belief that digitization is an acceptable
form of fixation" since digitization fits within the House Report's definition of fixation 2
Furthermore, through a happy accident of mechanics, in order to view a document
residing in one part of the NII, one must reproduce the appropriate digital combinations
in the random access memory ("RAM")63 of one's local NII site, "thereby fixing the
document. There has been some debate concerning whether existence in RAM memory
is too ephemeral to be considered fixation and is instead unfixed like a work projected
53. See id. at 5-7.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 7 (recalling that the introduction of both photocopying machines and audiotape recorders posed problems
for copyright owners).
56. Id. at 8; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
57. GREEN PAPER, .supra note 50, at 8.
58. Id. at 9 (quoting the inscription at the Thomas Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C.).
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 10.
61.Seeid, at 13.
62. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 52-53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665-66.1
63. RAM is that portion of a computer's memory which can be written upon, viewed, and, if the user so desires,
written upon again with something new. This makes information stored in RAM somewhat less permanent (and therefore
less fixed) than information stored in a computer's read only memory ("ROM") which is hardwired into the computer's
memory and not generally changeable by the user.
64. An example of a local Nil site would be an individual user's personal computer which is connected to the
Internet.
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briefly onto a movie screen or shown electronically on a television.6 However, such a
distinction would be dubious at best. The spirit of the current copyright law seems to
suggest that if a work can be perceived in different places and at different times without
movement of the original work, then an infringement has occured. Because they
followed the spirit of the law, the Task Force's failure to quibble about temporary
fixation in RAM verses more permanent fixation in ROM was not a shortcoming.
The Task Force's other "minor" amendments include a new transmission right,66
revisions to the first sale doctrine,67 new laws prohibiting the circumvention of
anticopying devices, 61 a new provision including copyright management information,6 9
and the inclusion of a public performance right in sound recordings."0 The combination
of these amendments would provide copyright owners heightened protection.
A. Transmission Right
Currently § 106(3) of the Act provides copyright owners the right to distribute copies
or phonorecords by means of "sale or by other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending."'" The Task Force recommends an amendment to § 106(3) that includes the
exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work by means
of transmission. 2 This recommendation is somewhat baffling since, in order to transmit
a copyrighted work, one has to copy it into the memory of the receiving computer. Such
copying would already be a violation of § 106(1) which grants the author an exclusive
right to reproduce the copyrighted work.
Perhaps the Task Force contemplates an advance in technology enabling transmission
of a work without reproducing that work. However, should that occur, such a
transmission would be the functional equivalent of buying one's own copy of a book and
subsequently selling that same copy to someone else. In such a case, one has merely
disposed of one's own property without creating more copies which would diminish the
market for the copyright owner. This is the kind of activity which seems to be allowed
by § 109(a) of the Act,n the statutory embodiment of the "first sale doctrine."
The first sale doctrine is a legal provision which makes it possible for "wholesalers
who buy books to distribute those copies to retailers and retailers to sell them to
consumers and consumers to give them to friends and friends to sell them in garage sales
and so on-all without the permission of (or payment to) the copyright owner of the
work." 74 Therefore, the Task Force's recommendation of an exclusive right to transmit
seems to be, at best, redundant and, at worst, an attempt to limit the transfer of one's own
property on the irrational ground that the transfer was done electronically rather than
through more conventional means.
65. See GREEi PAPER, supra note 50, at IS.
66. Id. at 121.
67.Id. at 124-25.
68.Id. at 125-30.
69.Id. at 130-31.
70.Jd. at 131-33.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
72. GREEN PAPER, supra note 50, at 121.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
74. GREEN PAPER, supra note 50, at 54 (citation omitted).
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B. Prohibition of Circumvention ofAnticopying Devices
In addition to the transmission right, the Task Force recommended adding laws to
prohibit the circumvention of anticopying devices." Specifically, the Task Force
proposed adding § 512 to Chapter 5 of the Act making it illegal to
[i]mport, manufacture, or distribute any device, product, or component incorporated into
a device or product, or offer or perform any service, the primary purpose or effect of
which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without
authority of the copyright owner or the law, any process, treatment, mechanism of
system which prevents or inhibits the exercise of any of the exclusive rights under
section 106.76
- At its broadest, the proposed amendment would make it illegal to distribute any device
having the primary effect of circumventing processes inhibiting the exercise of § 106's
exclusive rights. This proposed provision is far too broad because it cuts against the grain
of Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios.' The Supreme Court in Sony did not look at the
primary purpose or effect of a device, but instead allowed the import, manufacture, and
distribution of devices that could be used to infringe copyrights provided that these
devices also had a substantial noninfringing use.7' Although the legislature is capable of
overriding the Court's statutory interpretation by amending the statute, it should refrain
from doing so without good reason. Moreover, the legislature is constitutionally
prohibited from amending the statute where such an amendment does not promote the
progress of science and useful arts.79
Far from promoting science and the useful arts, such an amendment would do much to
frustrate them. For example, it would prevent programmers from obtaining devices to
help them reverse engineer their copies of a computer program." Furthermore, the
inability to determine how a program works prevents a programmer from creating another
program which can work with the first. The amendment would do the sciences and useful
arts a great disservice by hindering the interoperability of programs and systems.
C. Copyright Management Information
In the interest of protecting the public from fraud in the creation or alteration of
information, the Task Force recommends a modification that will protect any "copyright
management information" associated with a work from fraudulent inclusion, removal, or
alteration." Copyright management information would include the name of the copyright
owner, the terms and conditions for uses of the work, and identification codes associated
75. See id. at 125-30.
76. Id. at 128.
77.464 U.S. 417 (1984). This case involved the infringing uses to which a VCR could be put; for example, making
copies of rented videos. The Supreme Court ruled that Sony would not be liable for infringing uses since VCRs could be
put to entirely proper uses, such as time delay in viewing where an individual could tape a broadcast show being aired at
an inconvenient time and view the show at a later time. Id. at 456.
78. See id. at 442.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
80. Reverse engineering allows programmers to determine how a program works and add to that program or
incorporate their newly gained knowledge into another program.
81. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 50, at 131.
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with a work.' Specifically, the Task Force proposed the addition of subsections (g) and
(h) to § 506 of the Act 3:
(g) Fraudulent Copyright Management Information. - Any person who, with fraudulent
intent, digitally links with a copy of a copyrighted work copyright management
information that such person knows to be false, or who, with fraudulent intent, publicly
distributes or imports for public distribution any work with which copyright
management information that such person knows to be false is linked, shall be fined not
more than $2,500.
(h) Fraudulent Removal of Copyright Management Information. - Any person who,
with fraudulent intent, removes or alters any copyright management information
digitally linked with a copy of a copyrighted work shall be fined not more than $2,500."
The copyright management information provisions are not objectionable in and of
themselves, but they seem redundant and do not serve the goal of promoting the sciences
and useful arts. The provisions require fraudulent intent and, as such, seem to duplicate
the purpose of existing antifraud laws.
Though highly speculative, one goal of adding subsections (g) and (h) may be to
encourage copyright owners to place copyright management information in their
copyrighted works. Perhaps the Task Force believes that this information is desirable
because it may facilitate the tracking and sorting of works. A preoccupation with tracking
and sorting evidences a bureaucratic mindset and the amendments would be a roundabout
way to pursue such a goal. A more direct and effective method to encourage creators to
aid in the tracking and sorting of copyrighted works would be to directly require creators
to add copyright management information to their works. 5
D. Performance Rights in Sound Recordings
The Task Force recommends revisions to the Act that include a public performance
right in sound recordings:"
[Currently, in order] to play a record on the radio, [for example,] a radio station must
get a license from, and pay a royalty to, the copyright owner of the underlying musical
work (i.e., the person or entity who owns the rights in the notes and the lyrics), but it
does not have to obtain permission from, or pay a license fee to, the copyright owner
of the sound recording or the performer on the record."
This Task Force recommendation would provide the copyright holder a performance right
in sound recordings in instances of digital transmission." The Task Force wishes to give
performers the right to restrict the activities of digital transmitters but not the activities
of those who choose to transmit in other ways, such as by broadcasting over the radio. 9
82. Id. at 130-31.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 506.
84. GREEN PAPER, supra note 50, at 131.
85. Of course, creators want and deserve credit for their works. A provision which requires users to acknowledge
their source is unobjectionable. However, such a requirement would gain nothing from undue specificity as to what form
the acknowledgement must take. A bare requirement that one recognize the author and the name of the work would
probably suffice without delving into technical requirements about copyright management information.
86. GREEN PAPER, supra note 50, at 131-33.
87. Id. at 132.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 132-33. In defending his desire for the payment of royalties to record companies and performers, not
just publishers and composers, Bmice Lehman, chairman of the Task Force said, "'I'm not going to apologize for that...
. Ifpeople want to say that we should encourage people to steal intellectual property, then Ijust have a disagreement with
them. It's a matter of right and wrong." Junda Woo, Big Copyright Curbs Sought by Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1994,
105919961
INDIA NA LA W JOURNAL
This recommendation is perhaps the Task Force's most offensive for two reasons. First,
in the name of equity for performers (performance inequity), the Task Force recommends
the creation of an inequity between those who transmit digitally and those who transmit
in another manner (digital inequity). Second, the recommendation demonstrates a glaring
disregard for the fundamental purpose of copyright. The copyright clause of the U.S.
Constitution is an instrumental clause. In light of the Task Force's apparent
absentmindedness as to the foundation of copyright'law, the clause bears repeating at the
risk of redundancy: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."9 There is nothing in the
Green Paper or in common observation which suggests that this perceived performance
--inequity has created a shortage of artists to perform copyrighted works; if anything, a glut
of such artists exists. To the contrary, creating an additional obstacle for those trying to
transmit works digitally would effectively frustrate any promotion or creation of science
and the useful arts by inhibiting the dissemination of such works.
None of these proposed amendments are likely to promote the goals of copyright.
Instead, they increase the level of control authors have over their copyrighted material.
The tone of the Task Force's fair use discussion and other limitations on the copyright
owner's exclusive rights indicates an eagerness to expand authors' rights and relative
apathy towards the goal of public dissemination of information. The Task Force no more
than cursorily acknowledges that the Act exists for the benefit of the public and that the
law should strive to make information freely available. Immediately thereafter, the Task
Force asserts that "freely available" does not mean "available free," and goes on to
express concerns that copyright owners not be required to donate "on-line time" for their
works. In lieu of any suggestions as to how the public interest will be served by the new
digital technologies, the Task Force announces a forthcoming conference to discuss the
public interest; an announcement which is curious in light of its vagueness considering
the specificity of proposals in the area of expanded rights for owners.9' The message of
these recommendations seems to be that the Task Force will see what rights are left over
for the public once the rights of the authors have been firmly established.
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The adverse impact of inadequate congressional action is even greater than it appears
on the surface. Such inadequacies will be multiplied around the globe through a network
of international intellectual property treaties. The United States' intellectual property
at B5. This highlights some of Lehman's misconceptions about intellectual property. First, digital transmission is not
stealing until the law labels it as such. This is particularly true in the case of intangible property where such "stealing"
leaves the "victim" with as much as before something was "stolen." Second, copyright questions are not questions of right
and wrong; they are questions of whether the means of copyright are sufficient to reach the constitutional end of promoting
science and the useful arts.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
91. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 50, at 133-34.
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laws are bound to those of other nations, primarily by means of the Berne Convention92
and the Universal Copyright Convention.'
These conventions provide that once a work has been published in a member country,
the copyright owner can enforce that copyright in another member country at least to the
extent that nationals of that country could enforce the copyright if the work were first
published there. In addition, the conventions guarantee certain specific minimum rights
to copyright owners regardless of a member-nation's laws.
94
The conventions' provisions mean that any additional grant of rights to prevent
dissemination would be provided not only to copyright owners in the United States, but
also to owners in every member nation. This is not just idle discussion; these conventions
will be particularly important when dealing with the Internet since the connecting digital
networks greatly facilitate international exchanges. The global web of information is so
seamless at times that it is easy to import or export copyrighted material to or from
another country without even realizing that international boundaries are being crossed. 9"
These interwoven laws, much like the network itself, greatly magnify the number of
people to whom an individual may be held accountable. Therefore, it is that much more
important that copyright laws receive careful scrutiny to minimize the impact of the
inevitable imperfections. The Task Force's recommendations simply do not satisfy this
rigorous examination because they provide the copyright owner too much protection and
fail to give enough consideration to the goal of widespread dissemination of information
and ideas. 96
Perhaps even more important is the United States' role as a leader and pioneer. The
Task Force now faces a problem with which all nations will eventually have to grapple.
New technology has rendered the old paradigms of copyright obsolete. A failure by the
United States to address properly the problems at hand will be compounded by those who
follow. Therefore, the Task Force has even more responsibility than would appear at first
glance, but it has responded inadequately.
V. THE PROBLEM
In a sense, the Task Force's attempt to tighten the reins is quite understandable. As
noted above, copyright law attempts to protect expression by proxy through its
embodiment in the physical world.97 The embodiment of expression in the physical world
is becoming more and more tenuous, however, as digital technology grows. The
capability to convey expression from one person to another is fast approaching direct
exchange of thought without embodiment of an intermediate physical form. Or, at the
very least, if the previous description seems too transcendental, the intermediate form of
expression is becoming "liquid" where previous and current copyright law deals with a
solid.
92. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (entered into force for the United States
Mar. 1, 1989) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101).
93. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952,6 U.S.T. 2731 (1952), revisedJuly 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
943 U.N.T.S. 178 (1974).
94. See Charles J. Meyer, Note, National and International Copyright Liabilityfor Electronic System Operators,
2 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 497, 514 (1995).
95. See ED KIGOL, THE WHOLE INTERitEr 37 (2d ed. 1994).
96. See supra text accompanying note 91.
97. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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One can view the Task Force's recommendation as akin to attempting to hold on to a
melting object; one clutches it more tightly in a vain attempt to prevent it from falling to
the ground. As John Perry Barlow puts it:
Since we don't have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind of challenge, and
are apparently unable to delay the galloping digitization of everything not obstinately
physical, we are sailing into the future on a sinking ship.
This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law, was developed to
convey forms and methods of expression entirely different from the vaporous cargo it
is now being asked to carry. It is leaking as much from within as without.
Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three forms: a frenzy of deck
chair rearrangement, stem warnings to the passengers that if she goes down, they will
face harsh criminal penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial. 8
The legal efforts attempting to reconcile digital technology with copyright law reflect
a larger problem. It has always been the case that new technology creates unforeseen
difficulties. In fact, Lewis Mumford suggested that the invention of the clock by and for
the use of the monasteries led to their undoing. 9 The new technology made it possible
to abstract time in humans' minds and, once abstracted, time could be controlled and
regimented."° Control and regimentation led to the rise of capitalism",' which in turn led
to the decline of religion and the monasteries. While this description is something of an
oversimplification, the main point is straightforward. New technology is created in
pursuit of purposes which are consistent with the status quo, but aside from the original
goals, the new technology also creates possibilities which challenge the status quo. Once
these possibilities are available, humans naturally explore them and disrupt the
established order with these new possibilities. The law can recognize this and embrace
the new possibilities with as little disruption as possible, or the law can futilely attempt
to barricade that which is new, different, and disruptive. 2
The video and musical recording industries have benefited from the development of
digital technology. The technology allowed a cleaner and more refined sound and picture.
But those industries will learn, if they have not already, that in addition to providing
better pictures and sounds, digital technology allows nearly unlimited dissemination of
works without any deterioration in quality. Interested parties, such as the established
recording and movie industries and the authors of the Green Paper, would like to keep
the intended benefits of digital technology-the improved picture and sound
quality-while squelching the unintended disseminatory possibilities of the new
technology.
This course of action is almost certain to fail. The law needs to adapt and embrace new
technology, not become more rigid and try to withstand it. As the Court recognized in
Sony:
98. Barlow, supra note 39, at 85.
99. See, e.g., LEwis MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 12-14 (1963).
100. See id. at 14-15.
101. See id. at 14.
102. While this position may seem a bit extreme, it is grounded in historical developments, particularly those
developments with powerful potential. For example, the printing press allowed for mass printing of the Bible,
individualized worship, and Protestantism in general; the Catholic Church stood in the way and bloody wars followed.
The ideas of equality and liberty took hold in 18th-century France; the established nobility stood in the way and were
killed. Nothing quite so dire is likely to occur because of the clash between existing copyright law and the capabilities
of digital technology. But if the new technologies cany great potential, the law will be unsuccessful in stopping such gains
and should try to work with the new possibilities rather than stand against them.
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From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying
equipment-the printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright
protection. Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been
the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. 03
Furthermore, the Court noted,
"The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with freedom
of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of
dissemination, on the other. Successive ages have drawn different balances among the
interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the
related interest of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in the
untrammeled dissemination of ideas." 104
Digital technology is a significant new means to disseminate information and it is time
for copyright law to change accordingly. It is time for the law to recognize properly the
media which it attempts to govern. If the law remains unchanged- attempting to govern
as solid that which is essentially liquid-it will have to create an unnecessary and
inexcusable scarcity of access to copyrighted works in order to work. This is so because
current copyright law is premised upon a need (a need which is becoming less
pronounced) for works to manifest themselves tangibly before communication between
people is possible. Therefore, an artificial scarcity would arise in large part from
precarious balancing acts which try to pay homage to the old ways, but which also
attempt to recognize the new possibilities.
A concrete example of such a balancing act is a policy which allows the public to
access a public digital library only from existing physical libraries. Such access would
allow at least a slight improvement in the collections of existing libraries; it would make
it at least theoretically possible for the public to have access to digital works by means
of a computer terminal in the physical library; it would prevent the obsolescence of
existing libraries by making them a legal requisite to digital library access; and
inconvenient access would encourage the purchase of one's own physical copy of the
work. Unfortunately, these access requirments would also create inexcusable waste and
unnecessary scarcity. The waste would arise from the inefficient movement of people to
gain access. Direct distribution of digital works to the home would be just as cost
effective, if not more so, than a more centralized method of distribution, such as a library
or software store. Creating an informational bottleneck at the physical library would in
turn create an unnecessary deprivation of knowledge for those without the time,
inclination, or transportation necessary to reach a physical library capable of accessing
the requisite information.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
As the Sony Court noted, copyright law has always sought to reach a balance with new
technology. 05 The Task Force seems to recognize this in principle, but fails to take a
103. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984).
104. 1d at 430-31 n.12 (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)).
105. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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realistic view of the state of information technology and its near future. The coat is not
merely a little tight, it is about ready to burst at the seams.,0 6
Though new technology creates new problems, it also creates new solutions. For
example, new communications make production and dissemination of works considerably
cheaper. This is true because, in a traditional sense, there is no need to put the work on
a physical body, nor is there a need to transport it physically through space. 0 7 Therefore,
the old costs have been decimated and an author is no longer dependent on a publisher
to put forth the money to produce and disseminate.
Currently, publishing costs take a lion's share of a book's total receipts. Authors rarely
receive even twenty percent of revenues as royalties.' Therefore, in devising a new
scheme of copyright, it would only be necessary to recapture about twenty percent of the
current selling prices of books in order to induce authors to create. °9 And, while this may
still prove a Homeric task, it should be easier than recapturing 100% of the current selling
prices. Some might argue that publishers serve a greater function than mere production
and dissemination. They find authors whose books people want to read, generate indices
in appropriate books, and create demand for those books through advertising. True as this
may be, aside from production and dissemination, publishers do not serve a purpose that
copyright law needs to recognize. So long as the work is created and disseminated to the
public, copyright law has served its function."0 All else is incidental and, should the
public desire to benefit from the other services provided by publishers, they are surely
capable of contracting with publishers and paying for those services.,
The question remains as to how to recapture a fraction of the current selling price of
works while still allowing the exploitation of the new possibilities created by digital
technology. While this Comment does not illustrate a specific path which new legislation
must take to reach copyright utopia, perhaps it points to the general direction. As noted
above, digital technology virtually eliminates the physical realm as a governing factor
since it all but eliminates tangibility as a requirement for communication at a distance.
Therefore, with the physical realm eliminated as the way to govern works, it makes sense
to turn to the temporal. Current copyright law grants authors copyright protection for life
plus fifty years."' Works made for hire, as well as anonymous and pseudonymous works,
receive copyright protection for a term of either seventy-five years from the first
publication or one hundred years from the year of creation, whichever is shorter." 13 When
the term of protection expires, the copyrighted work falls into the public domain.
These time frames are quite extensive. One might question whether these time spans
fall within the constitutional meaning of "for limited times."' 4 However, such an inquiry
106. See stpra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
107. It is true that a digitized work must reside in the physical memory of the computer from time to time and that the
information must travel in the form of energy through space. The space, however, is so much smaller and the speed of
transport is so much faster that the old rules hardly apply.
108. Edwin McDowell, Authors Agreeing to Smaller Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1981, at C7.
109. The percentage of revenue currently used to induce authors to create probably varies from industry to industry,
hut in any case, that percentage underthis scheme would be substantially closer to 100% with the cost of production and
distribution nearly eliminated.
110. Margaret Chon, Posintodent "ProgreKy": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAuL L. REV.
97, 107 (1993) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)).
111. On the other hand, if the demand for publishers drastically declines, it is not the law's job to provide for their
future. Although those involved in the production of clay and wedges for cuneiform tablets were probably hurt by the
introduction of paper, it seems absurd to suggest that the law should have provided for them.
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
113. Id. § 302(c).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 8.
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would probably be less fruitful than an inquiry into the desirability of such lengthy times.
A new copyright law could profit from vastly curtailing the time for which a work is
protected while greatly increasing the author's power of exclusive rights during that time.
My proposal is that copyright law recognize the rights of authors for approximately
five years and allow an author to pursue profits from any use of that work. Five years is
an arbitrary amount of time, but it seems that the profits which authors could realize in
five years would be sufficient to induce them to create their works. In any event, the time
period needed to provide authors just enough incentive to yield optimal levels of
invention necessary for "progress""' will be considerably less than a lifetime plus fifty
years, particularly with the entire world at one's fingertips as a market.
New technology will also aid the author's pursuit of these profits. Electronic money
and credit have arrived, and will continue to grow in prominence. Selling goods on the
Internet will be far easier once purchasers can pay simply by hitting a few keys. There
are certainly some risks to making payments online, the most prominent being the
security of funds used to pay for the goods, but such risks are no greater than paying by
credit card number over the telephone.
Of course, not all bastions of copyright law must be destroyed-only those which stand
in the way of the free dissemination of knowledge and ideas. For example, the copyright
law could allow the creator to maintain an exclusive right to sell copies of a work for the
creator's lifetime plus fifty years. This would not stop the spread of information; it would
only stop others from financially profiting from the works of others. Similarly, any
person copying a substantial portion of a work could be required to acknowledge the
author as the creator of the work. Indeed, such acknowledgment often more effectively
motivates creation than does fiscal reward, particularly in academic circles. Furthermore,
requiring such recognition is not likely to stop someone from forwarding useful
information to a colleague in the same way that requiring that they first track down the
creators and negotiate a fee would discourage them.
Other suggestions for the future of intellectual property come from John Perry
Barlow." 6 Barlow suggests that "information economics, in the absence of objects, will
be based more on relationship than possession." ' Two examples of this sort of
relationship are real-time performances and services."' The real-time performance, he
suggests, will be an option for many works made possible by digital technology."
9
Payments for these performances will function like ticket sales to concerts rather than like
paying to rent a video tape of that concert.
As a second model for compensating creators, Barlow suggests payment for services,
noting that "the entire professional class-doctors, lawyers, consultants, architects, and
so on-are ... being paid directly for their intellectual property."'2 Furthermore, the
history of intellectual property shows a tradition of creators being paid for their service
to someone else. "Before the industrialization of creation, writers, composers, artists, and
the like produced their products in the private service of [their] patrons. Without objects
115. For a thorough discussion of the meaning of progress as it pertains to intellectual property, see Chon, supra note
110. As a general proposition, Chon concludes that the "project of the patent and copyright clause must be understood as
access to knowledge." Id. at 146.
116. See Barlow, srpra note 39.
117.Id. at 128.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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to distribute in a mass market, creative people will return to a condition somewhat like
this, except that they will serve many patrons rather than one."'' Barlow uses an example
of the computer hacker buying a legitimate copy of a product in order to take advantage
of the technical support offered to purchasers as evidence of service being the means by
which creditors get paid. 2
CONCLUSION
Digital technology has created vast new possibilities, many of them unexpected.
Among these unexpected possibilities are means to effectuate the wide dissemination of
information-a desirable turn of events for any society which prides itself on democratic
ideals and a well-informed populace. Unfortunately, laws made in light of past
technologies stand in the way of maximizing the benefits of future technologies.
Specifically, the Copyright Act of 1976, which attempted to legislate for the future, did
not foresee and therefore did not provide an adequate mechanism for the potential created
by digital technology. As a result, the Task Force, attempting to make recommendations
for the new developments, looked toward the already antiquated Act and made
recommendations which failed to further the ends of the Act and the Constitution. These
recommendations also do not serve the purpose of the copyright-to provide the
economic engine for the creation and dissemination of ideas."
The Act and, consequently, the Task Force, are inadequate because they both relied on
the premise that works have to manifest themselves physically in order to be
communicated. This premise is becoming less frequently true, and mistakes made in
domestic laws are spread throughout the world by virtue of international intellectual
property treaties as well as by perpetuating the paradigm of fixed copies. Future
intellectual property law must recognize the increasingly flawed nature of that premise.
This area of law must find a way to work with the changing state of intellectual property,
whether it be through one of the suggestions contained in this Comment or through ideas
that present themselves as the nature of the new technology becomes clearer.
121. Id.
122. Id. Barlow discusses the use of encryption as a means to protect intellectual property owners against hackers.
Encryption, although useful, has some serious flaws. The most serious of these is that no matter how well encrypted one's
work is, there is always someone who will be able to decrypt it. The decryptors will often come to see themselves as
having earned the right to it. As Barlow writes, "It has always appeared to me that the more security you hide your goods
behind, the more likely you are to turn your sanctuary into a target." Id. In the same vein he writes,
[A] social overreliance on protection by barricades rather than conscience will eventually wither the latter
by turning intrusion and theft into a sport, rather than a crime.... Furthermore, I would argue that initial
efforts to protect digital copyright by copy protection contributed to the current condition in which most
otherwise ethical computer users seem morally untroubled by their possession of pirated software.
Id.
123. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (discussing the benefits afforded to
authors and the public as a result of copyright law).
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